The Moral Virtue of Doublemindedness by Beggs, Donald (ASU author) & Barrett, the Honors College
ABSTRACT 
The Moral Virtue of Doublemindedness 
The conscientious are morally conflicted when their moral dilemmas or incommensurabilities, 
real or apparent, have not been resolved. But such doublemindedness need not lead to ethical 
disintegration or moral insensitivity. For one may develop the moral virtue of doublemindedness, 
the settled power to deliberate and act well while morally conflicted. Such action will be 
accompanied by both moral loss (perhaps ‘dirty hands’) and ethical gain (salubrious agental 
stability). In explaining the virtue’s moral psychology I show, among other things, its 
consistency with wholeheartedness and the unity of the virtues. To broaden its claim to 
recognition, I show the virtue’s consistency with diverse models of practical reason. In 
conclusion, Michael Walzer’s interpretation of Hamlet’s attitude toward Gertrude exemplifies 
this virtue in a fragmentary but nonetheless praiseworthy form. 
 
The Moral Virtue of Doublemindedness 
It was glorious to see -  
if your heart were iron. 
Iliad 13 (Lombardo trans.) 
 
What moral virtue would be acquired were one to generalize then emulate the seemingly 
doubleminded orientations of soldiers which Aquinas and Kant recommended, respectively, to 
be a ‘kindly severity against [the enemy’s] will’, and to have ‘some sort of trust in the attitude of 
2 
 
the enemy’?1 However that generalization might best be articulated, surely it should point to a 
determination to make the best of a bad situation while remaining true to oneself, a situation 
typified, as these quotations suggest, by an agent’s inherent moral conflict. 
Along these lines, in advising princes to learn how not to be good, Machiavelli did not 
promote single-minded ruthlessness. Rather, he encouraged leaders for the sake of the 
commonweal to be, when necessary, immoral doublemindedly. Broadening the domain of such 
value conflicts, Bernard Williams remarked that for the ‘various forces and passions to co-exist 
in some semblance of a stable political order under democratic forms requires a good deal of 
‘double-mindedness’.’2 Part of Williams’s point can be put this way: if reasonable citizens in a 
democracy should sometimes be coerced by other reasonable citizens, then both sides should 
learn to embrace doublemindedness. But there are far more occasions for praiseworthy 
doublemindedness than these martially and politically oriented remarks suggest. 
In the first section of this paper, I explain how doublemindedness can be a moral virtue 
and how it differs, for example, from ambivalence. Setting forth the moral psychology and 
ethical content of this virtue gives its claim to recognition appropriate force. In the second 
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section, this virtue is shown to be compatible with incompatible theories of practical reason. This 
will deepen the virtue’s claim to recognition by showing its coherence with reason and will 
broaden that claim by showing its consistency with a variety of theories. In conclusion, Michael 
Walzer’s interpretation of Hamlet’s attitudes and actions toward Gertrude makes vivid essential 
aspects of the virtue. Although present only fragmentarily in Hamlet, we will see that even this 
virtue’s incomplete form makes the Prince more admirable than if he lacked it altogether. 
 
I. The Moral Psychology and Ethical Content of Doublemindedness 
Conscientiousness is habitually perspicuous assessment of the relative moral weights of 
the reasons that steer one toward or away from one’s practical alternatives. I define the moral 
virtue of doublemindedness (DM) to be an agent’s settled power to deliberate conscientiously 
when morally conflicted and, having failed to resolve that conflict, nevertheless to reach a 
practical conclusion which entails moral loss for the agent (perhaps because her act harmed an 
innocent other) as well as ethical gain (because agental integration is stabilized or enhanced). 
Agents are morally conflicted when faced with moral dilemmas (real or apparent), equally 
weighty incommensurabilities or incomparables (real or apparent), very narrow moral 
differences between mutually exclusive practical alternatives, or compounded moral complexity. 
To deliberate conscientiously in such situations respects relevant persons, values, principles, and 
so on.  
DM is not reducible to conscientiousness. Conscientiousness is simple even if the 
thoroughness of its activity encounters complexity or subtlety. DM, on the other hand, has four 
distinct and defining markers. (1) The virtue can be instantiated only after conscientiously taking 
up a moral dilemma (or etcetera), and (2) only if action ensues from that practical deliberation. 
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As a result, (3) a DM agent properly anticipates and experiences moral loss, perhaps because 
innocent others are harmed or an important value of the agent’s has been violated. Finally, (4) 
agental unity is stabilized or enhanced, an ethical gain. Marker (1) alone entails that DM and 
conscientiousness cannot be identical since someone could be conscientious after acting but not 
before. For example, the press of circumstance may not permit thorough examination of the 
facts, even though after the fact a conscientious agent will review details of the previous action 
situation. In addition, marker (3) is not only not necessary for conscientiousness, its avoidance is 
thought to be part of the point of conscientiousness. 
Few authors have approached the concept of DM - I just referred to Michael Walzer as 
one. But some of those have gone so far as to contrast a morally unacceptable single-mindedness 
with an unnamed, virtuous alternative. David Carr, for example, does not use the expression 
‘doubleminded’ or any of its cognates, but he does contrast the doublemined experiences of a 
virtuous person when facing a morally fraught situation with the experiences and character of the 
merely single-mindedly continent. He says that ‘continence may be an inability to face the 
emotional and moral complexity’ of normal existence; the continent ‘may be single-minded to a 
fault’.3 Carr pushes further, emphasizing that ‘Aristotle’s concept of continence might be 
considered a morally required developmental stage on the way to virtue’.4 In my view, DM 
requires conscientiousness in a similar way, as a precondition. A difference is that while 
continence should be replaced by virtue, as a virtue DM incorporates conscientiousness. My 
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endorsement of significant aspects of Carr’s discussion is not affected by the fact that I believe 
that some of the continent can conscientiously inhabit ‘emotional and moral complexity’. So, I 
will argue that DM can be possessed by either the fully virtuous or the firmly continent who are 
not single-minded about the relevant moral situation. 
Carr presents a possible virtuous Ximene in love with Cid and yet in deep moral distress 
because of his violence toward her father. With this he contrasts a single-minded Ximene. 
[I]t takes a virtuous Ximene to appreciate that her conflicted simultaneous love and 
resentment of Cid have objective grounds and cannot be wished away and that require 
honest and courageous confrontation. [. . . A] more single-mindedly continent Ximene 
[would lack] not only the self understanding but also the moral imagination [. . .] that the 
wisdom of virtue demands.
5
 
One of Ximene’s principal virtues, implied and so unnamed, is DM. The virtuous Ximene 
conscientiously confronts a moral dilemma and courageously acts (markers 1 and 2). Throughout 
this she will sympathetically anticipate the educative internal conflict (she hopes) her beloved 
will undergo, and she regrets causing this distress (marker 3). 
How does Ximene’s conscientiously courageous confrontation of Cid combined with 
pained sympathy for his distress contribute to her agental unity (marker 4)? For the remainder of 
this section, I will address this question in a general form and from various perspectives. 
The basic idea is that the experience of moral loss after conscientious action will either 
enhance or erode agental unity, and such enhancement is praiseworthy. Consider the range of 
types of example of grappling with moral complexity (etcetera) which result in moral loss for the 
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agent. In some cases, there will be significant and unavoidable moral wrongs or harms to others, 
and the agent’s experience of ‘dirty hands’ is an explicit acknowledgement of such moral loss. 
Sometimes choices among moral goods must be tragic.
6
 Less significantly, similar to Ximene’s 
case, the moral loss might amount to no more than what Christopher Gowans has called ‘moral 
disquiet’ or ‘moral distress’: 
mental pain in response to the recognition that they have done something morally wrong - 
not necessarily in the sense of having violated the correct conclusion of moral 
deliberation but in the sense of having transgressed some moral value.
7
 
Or, the loss may be simply that a significant ethical good must be denied, say, career for family. 
So a DM agent’s moral loss can range from significant wrongdoing, which is best all things 
considered (‘dirty hands’), to agent-centered, worrisome ‘what-ifs’. 
When one acts conscientiously in spite of internal moral conflict and there is nevertheless 
moral loss, then, having done one’s best, one reaffirms one’s life narrative. Such internally 
sanctioned reaffirmations have a strong likelihood of contributing to reasonable, not rigid, 
agental stability. Bearing such burdens well and their being occasions of becoming more 
volitionally integrated is DM’s marker 4. 
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The alternative to agental integration in the types of cases indicated is character erosion. 
Why? First, we need a distinction. The rational consistency of a motivational set refers to logical 
relations among its concepts, principles, and precepts; the reasonable integration of a 
motivational set refers to desirable forms of practical stability. If conscientiousness has not 
begun to unravel or to be disabled in spite of living through repeated episodes involving 
mutually exclusive moral alternatives, those experiences will contribute to stabilizing or 
integrating the reasonable agent’s motivational set without necessarily making the set’s elements 
more rationally consistent. But a satisfactorily integrated motivational set which may be 
explicitly not rationally consistent is one in which incommensurable (etcetera) elements, 
whatever their moral weight or authority, continue to be motivational. 
What then is the alternative to the continuation of reasonably integrated motivational 
sets? Moral insensitivity and chronic ambivalence are the primary ways of denaturing the 
effectiveness of elements in a motivational set. The former is a loss of the intensity of the force 
of relevant elements, their authority, and the latter is an oscillation among elements’ relevance, 
their scope.
8
 And each, of course, encompasses a spectrum. Insensitivity can be for others an 
annoying indifference, or it can be pathological brutishness; the ambivalent will disappoint 
friends and coworkers, but they can also be such as rightly to precipitate therapeutic intervention. 
There are senses in which the insensitive and the ambivalent are stable, but such agents 
are stable in the wrong ways. Neither we nor the ambivalent agent may know what he will 
ultimately do, if anything, but we do know not to rely on someone whose ambivalence has 
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become fixed in character. And the fixedness of insensitivity arises from a significant blindness 
to the good and/or a significant deafness to the right. In contrast, DM’s stability derives from 
being conscientiously open to the good and/or the right. This practical disjunction between virtue 
and vice is brought about by repeated internal moral conflict which contributes to either 
stabilizing or destabilizing an agent. Yet there simply is no reason to suppose that all agents who 
are regularly doubleminded degrade into ambivalence or insensitivity. Accepting the burdens of 
virtue will at least maintain both the force and relevance of elements in a motivational set, will 
preserve the agent’s dynamic stability in a praiseworthy way. 
Possession of DM is not inconsistent with occasional ambivalence. Carr refers to the sort 
of ambivalence that is sometimes a difficulty for virtuous agents but not a condition of their 
character. This allows him to see that the sorts of moral experiences described above can have 
the integrating effect I claim they can. 
[R]ightly seen, far from impeding the development of virtue, emotional 
ambivalence and personal conflict may provide the rich psychological and moral 
soil, that—in the light of practical wisdom—is actually required to enhance the 
possibilities and prospects of virtuous character and conduct.
9
 
Carr is in effect saying that internal moral conflict for the virtuous will tend to be integrative.
10
 
Adding that observation to the previous rationales to suppose that marker 4 occurs, there is 
sufficient reason to set the burden of proof on the side of those who deny that acting 
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conscientiously while contending with internal moral conflict can have ethically good integrative 
effects. 
Deniers might try to shift the burden back by making their point indirectly (and then only 
by making very strong assumptions). They might claim that DM violates or is inconsistent with 
valuing either the unity of the virtues or wholeheartedness. Close examination of these notions, 
however, will show both objections to be inconclusive at best. If so, then direct and indirect 
arguments against the likelihood of ethically good agental integration through conscientious 
action under conditions of internal moral conflict will be turned aside. 
Harry Frankfurt distinguishes wholeheartedness from an ‘imposed equilibrium’.11 
Someone whose will has been focused by factors external to their motivational set can only 
simulate the genuine satisfaction characteristic of wholeheartedness. But since the sort of value 
conflicts which are constitutive of DM are inherent to the agent (marker 1), then whatever 
agental unity characterizes possessors of DM it cannot be ‘imposed’ in Frankfurt’s sense. On the 
other hand, Frankfurtian wholeheartedness is consistent with ‘virulent psychic conflict’.12 
Wholeheartedness cannot map onto Aristotle’s sōphrōn. For the sōphrōn ‘everything is in 
harmony with the voice of reason’ whereas for the enkratēs internal turmoil is common.13 So 
                       
11
  Harry G. Frankfurt, ‘The Faintest Passion’, in Necessity, Volition, and Love (Cambridge UK, 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 104. 
12
 Ibid., 100. 
13
 NE I.13.1102b. I cite Martin Ostwold’s translation, Nichomachean Ethics (Englewood Cliffs: 
Library of Liberal Arts, 1962), 31. 
10 
 
wholeheartedness encompasses a variety of sorts of agental unity which can include internal 
moral conflict and need not exclude the sōphrōn: the wholehearted may be firmly continent or 
fully virtuous. Yet continence is not an imposed equilibrium for the enkratēs will ‘know where 
he stands’ in light of his motivational set in spite of there being ‘inner opposition to his will’.14 
The firmly continent are not chronically ambivalent and, though they are not fully virtuous like 
Ximene, they may be wholehearted. 
So far, since wholeheartedness is consistent with some cases of inherent conflict it does 
not exclude DM. Can the DM, like the wholehearted, be ‘fully satisfied’ that their inherent 
psychic elements determine their cognitive, affective, attitudinal, and behavioral processes rather 
than others with which they conflict?
15
 But such others must be considerations of external factors 
such as lead to an ‘imposed equilibrium’. And nothing about the DM must prevent them from 
being satisfied that they have conscientiously done their best in light of their motivational set. 
The DM can be satisfied but can they be fully satisfied? How can anyone be fully 
satisfied when they possess a virtue marked by regret? But that the wholehearted must (by 
definition) be fully satisfied with their motivational set does not entail that they cannot regret the 
harm of an innocent person which that set warranted. Such harms may motivate attempts to make 
the set more rationally consistent, or for good reasons they may not. If the wholehearted can be 
fully satisfied even though their motivational set has ‘virulent’ inherent conflict—and no non-
contentious assumption makes impossible their concluding that some of these are inherently 
intractable—then nothing stands in the way of attributing to some who are wholehearted the 
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moral virtue of doublemindedness. Indeed, the wholehearted being fully satisfied in spite of 
persisting inherent conflict could be explained by the fact that their motivational set is well 
integrated although not rationally consistent. Being fully satisfied may be a sign that the 
wholehearted who are frequently conflicted have DM. So it is at least doubtful that DM is 
inconsistent with wholeheartedness. 
Would finding a form of doublemindedness to be a virtue threaten the unity of the 
virtues? It would take us too far afield to try to settle what such unity means, so I will limit 
discussion to McDowell’s ‘Virtue and Reason’. Virtuous persons know what to do morally, 
according to McDowell, not by applying principles ‘but by being a certain kind of person’.16 For 
McDowell, since moral ‘generalizations will be approximate at best’ then virtuous persons can 
reach appropriate practical conclusions only in light of their ‘entire conception of how to live’.17 
And such conceptions are neither susceptible of codification nor can they properly lead to a 
ranking of moral principles.
18
 It follows for McDowell that persons with such entire conceptions 
embody the unity of the virtues. 
[W]e cannot disentangle genuine possession of kindness from the sensitivity which 
constitutes fairness. And since there are obviously no limits on the possibilities for 
compresence, in the same situation, of circumstances of the sorts proper sensitivities to 
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which constitute all the virtues, the argument can be generalized: no one virtue can be 
fully possessed except by a possessor of all of them.
19
 
For the virtues help us to attend appropriately to disparate and possibly mutually exclusive yet 
equally good alternatives, yet virtuous persons navigate well those fractured terrains only 
because they are the kind of person they are. 
Good persons with an ‘entire conception of how to live’ understand that there is not 
‘always one right answer to the question what one should do’, that ‘ethical reality is immensely 
difficult to see clearly’.20 So McDowell’s understanding of the unity of the virtues can be seen to 
include related factors that precipitate the problems to which possessors of DM respond 
appropriately. First, good persons’ moral principles may be uncodifiable because they are 
irreconcilable (etcetera). McDowell would prefer that the primary explanation of uncodifiability 
be the inarticulability of our best and most basic moral attitudes and insights. But to the extent 
that reflection can shape our most basic moral insights or their close derivatives into 
expressibility, into moral generalizations, nothing McDowell says guarantees that these 
generalizations will be rationally consistent, commensurable, or fully codifiable. And however 
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that may be, ‘immensely difficult’ practical deliberations may at times result in conflicting 
practical conclusions just because of what’s inherent in the good person’s motivational set. This 
will bring about moral distress for that good person (markers 1-3). 
The second factor in McDowell’s understanding of the unity of the virtues which 
precipitates a need for DM is that conscientious moral deliberation does not guarantee clear 
conclusions. This can mean either that a conscientiously derived practical conclusion is 
ambiguous or that it is unclear which one among equally morally justified and relevant practical 
conclusions ought to have precedence. But the latter just is one of the structures that requires 
DM. And the former can lead to the latter because sometimes ambiguity can be resolved into a 
set of mutually exclusive alternatives each of which is clearer than their common source. So 
someone embodying the unity of the virtues can sometimes have deliberated conscientiously in 
spite of inherent conflict, and may have acted knowingly in ways that harmed innocent others 
(markers 1-3). 
So unity of the virtues is consistent with DM’s markers 1-3. But then either such agent’s 
unity is enhanced or stabilized, or moral insensitivity or chronic ambivalence will ensue. 
McDowell’s understanding of the unity of the virtues has a place for DM. Indeed, it seems that 
DM creates conditions conducive to the unity of the virtues. 
There is a further reservation about whether the unity of the virtues is consistent with 
DM. McDowell says that ‘salience . . . [is] seeing something as a reason for acting which 
silences all others’.21 But as we just saw achieving salience is ‘immensely difficult’. When 
conscientious deliberation cannot achieve salience, when would-be saliencies seem equally most 
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weighty, then the DM are able to proceed in an appropriately moral manner. What happens to 
good persons who lack DM and with some frequency cannot achieve salience? Over time, some 
of those good persons who encounter somewhat frequent inherent moral conflict may slip into 
moral insensitivity or ethical disintegration. But agency need not be damaged by not uncommon 
inherent conflict because there is a salutary and praiseworthy alternative. 
Finally, is the unity of the virtues consistent with DM’s openness to value pluralism and 
objective dilemmas? McDowell says that for a contemporary agent who has ‘a full-fledged 
possession’ of practical reason’s conceptual and dispositional resources ‘the idea of transcending 
historicity is profoundly suspect’.22 And those who are only firmly continent will also find this to 
be true. But both must contend with the pluralisms characteristic of modernity, first given voice 
by Machiavelli and analyzed by many since, especially Isaiah Berlin. McDowell goes on to say 
that since there is no ‘mode of inquiry that transcends historicity’, including the natural sciences 
and ethics, then ‘how the concepts are taken to hang together rationally [. . .] is the product of [. . 
.] historical evolution’.23 If so, then it would be contentious to insist that the rational hanging 
together of modes of inquiry are to be called failures if simple logical consistency is ever 
violated. A complete conception of how to live hangs together sufficiently if we understand that 
coherence to be the reasonable stability of the motivational set. For the virtuous an entire 
conception of how to live is best understood as in continual, conscientious modification, just as 
                       
22
 John McDowell, ‘Eudaimonism and Realism in Aristotle’s Ethics’, in The Engaged Intellect: 
Philosophical Essays (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 38. 
23
 Ibid. 
15 
 
the seaworthiness of a vessel at sea is regularly monitored and repaired.
24
 Hanging together well, 
motivational integration, is seen in practical stability, and this can value, without being enslaved 
to, logical consistency. But would it not impugn the firmly continent to insist that all of 
McDowell’s conscientious seafarers are fully virtuous? If the unity of the virtues need not be 
threatened by modernity’s pluralisms, then DM helps to explain why. 
My discussions of Frankfurt and McDowell show that objections to DM based on its 
supposed inconsistency with wholeheartedness or its supposed incompatibility with the unity of 
the virtues are at best inconclusive, and may be set aside. So strong direct and indirect objections 
to DM are answered. 
On my account of DM desirable degrees of agental unity should be judged for some 
balance of functional and subjective factors, not according to some single-minded Cartesian or 
Kantian standard. Amélie Rorty seems to agree with this. She has said that self-integrative agents 
will more likely be responsibly responsive to the moral heterogeneities and vicissitudes of 
existence if they acquire ‘Tory habits, and Whig critical capacities’.25 Rorty argues that since 
important constituents of these, such as empathy and autonomy respectively, often pull in 
opposite directions, then there must be strategies for their reconciliation if ‘a long-range 
integrative project for a conflicted agent’ is to succeed.26 Yet if we find it troubling that empathy 
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and autonomy cannot always be reconciled, and nevertheless we believe that certain Whig and 
Tory attitudes should continue to be cultivated, then reconciliation is understood too narrowly to 
mean only rational consistency. Giving proper emphasis to the integration of the motivational set 
gives Rorty-type projects of reconciliation a better chance to succeed. 
Recognition of DM may entail a claim even stronger than Rorty’s: a disposition for 
conflicted practical reason has a role in self-integration for both the fully virtuous and the firmly 
continent. That is why David Wiggins says that in deliberation 
over and over again, in normal life, we may reach accommodations between [mutually 
irreducible or irreconcilable] demands and live with conviction the accommodations that 
we find. The picture makes room for the thought that this is a part of the process by 
which [. . .] we acquire or make our own characters.
27
 
In other words, it is morally praiseworthy to possess a disposition for conflicted, conscientious 
practical reasoning because that can contribute to agental integration in the ‘normal life’ of 
modernity. 
For decades Thomas Nagel has insisted that many moral conflicts individuals experience 
are necessary and probably irresolvable. It seems to me curious, then, that the best attitude 
toward this condition that he has recommended seems to amount to: Get used to it; don’t be so 
needy for a single theory that will resolve all of your inherent moral conflicts. 
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[I]t is as irrational to despair of systematic ethics because one cannot find a completely 
general account of what should be done as it would be to give up scientific research 
because there is no general method of arriving at true beliefs.
28
 
But what would it mean to get used to persistent and irresolvable internal moral conflict without 
becoming fixed in harmful ambivalence or blameworthy moral insensitivity? When Wiggins 
says we should ‘reach accomodations’ with ourselves (and, I would add, our communities) he 
assumes DM’s praiseworthy integrative effect. Nagel says something similar with a political 
emphasis: we should ‘countenance’ what deeply morally offends but which is legitimately 
imposed upon us by democratic government.
29
 Yet in the shadow of inescapable moral conflicts 
internal to both selves and societies Nagel complains: ‘how can we put ourselves back 
together?’30 So he seems unable to let go the neediness for a general, single theory; he seems 
resigned to a ‘motivational logic [that] simply lacks the character of an integrated moral 
outlook’.31 But, as I have argued, that lack should not be thought to refer only to rational 
inconsistency but mainly to an absence of reasonable processes of agental integration. Lacking a 
comprehensive and rationally consistent moral theory is not inconsistent with possessing a 
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praiseworthy, integrated motivational set. After all, the wholehearted and those who embody the 
unity of the virtues may agree that they are better possessing DM. 
 
II. Locating Moral Doublemindedness in Theories of Practical Reason 
My account of DM presupposes no particular model of practical reason. So to elucidate 
DM by refracting it through different models of practical reason will deepen and broaden the 
virtue’s claim to recognition. There are, however, some preliminary worries. First, if DM is 
consistent with a lack of thoroughgoing rational consistency, as I argued in the previous section, 
then its claim to being rational can be disputed. In response, I say that if DM is consistent with 
several significant and distinctively different models of practical reason, then it is as rational as 
we could reasonably wish. Second, I will not show that DM is consistent with a plurality of 
theories of practical reason, but since DM can be shown to be consistent with several diverse 
models, then its claim to be recognized as a moral virtue is not plausibly denied on the ground 
that it might be inconsistent with some other theory of practical reason. 
Third, a strong objection attacks DM as such. Suppose two courses of action have equally 
weighty reasons in their favor but not only does the choice of one exclude the other, the 
satisfaction of one value or principle entails a loss in terms of the other. This is a typical situation 
that DM enables one to address well. The strong objection is that, under these conditions, it will 
be irrational to choose one course of action over the other. Given that conscientious deliberation 
concludes equal weight for each mutually exclusive action, on what grounds could a preference 
be based? A choice of one over the other, under these conditions, would be arbitrary. If so, then 
DM’s practical reasoning terminates in an irrational choice. Can a moral virtue pivot on an 
agent’s irrationality? 
19 
 
This objection fails to consider an important distinction. By hypothesis, the alternatives 
and the reasons for them will have been conscientiously scrutinized. The values at stake, the 
applicable principles, or the orientation toward salience, will have been integrated into the 
agent’s motivational set. And the values or principles will likely have become more robust and 
more fine grained in light of sometimes difficult specifications of them in various contexts - 
McDowell’s conscientious seafarers. So when values or the alternatives they point to conflict, or 
when values to which the agent is equally committed are incommensurable (etcetera) yet are 
equally relevant as well as mutually exclusive, then these conditions do indeed render the agent 
unable to discover the uniquely most rational preference. But that does not mean the choice of 
one of these alternatives will be irrational. Whichever alternative is chosen will have been 
conscientiously considered. It cannot be irrational in these circumstances to have deliberated and 
acted conscientiously but be unable to give a sufficient reason for honoring one value or 
alternative over another. It cannot be irrational for a good person to have done what they did 
when no one can show that there was something better they ought to have done or show some 
better deliberative route they could have taken.
32
 The practical structure of DM is not ideally 
rational but it is not irrational, and given frequent moral complexity, wide-spread pluralisms, and 
so on, it may be ideally reasonable. 
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Nor should this response to the objection be thought to endorse a form of satisficing. If 
DM is a significant contributor to the form and content of an action, then the agent aims to do 
what is best. But insofar as someone is properly satisficing less than the best is good enough. If 
under the circumstances satisficing is permissible then DM is not relevant; but, if DM is relevant 
then satisficing is not permissible. 
Let us turn now to different models of practical reason to see how DM might be 
consistent with them. I will look briefly at practical reasoning as making and executing plans, 
then in somewhat more detail I will take up three mutually inconsistent perspectives on practical 
reasoning. 
If practical reasoning is best understood as planning and carrying out, if practical reason 
should be seen as what enables one to live one’s life according to a, or according to one’s, plan, 
then DM is not possible if rational choice precludes the possibility of incommensurable 
(etcetera) final ends, or if conscientious deliberation entails that one cannot be blamed for 
ensuing actions. Rawls’s early understanding of practical reason was such a planning theory. He 
asserted both that practical reason is inconsistent with irreducibly plural ends and that its proper 
use invalidates moral blame.
33
 But other theories of practical reason as what guides planned 
living are consistent with either or both claims, and so have room for DM. For example, there is 
nothing in Michael Bratman’s ‘Taking Plans Seriously’ that is inconsistent with agents having 
irreducibly plural ends or being morally blamed for actions that he describes as following from 
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rational planning decisions or which were elements of reasonable plan executions.
34
 So DM is 
not compatible with all theories of practical reason understood as what enables agents to live 
according to plans, but it is consistent with at least one that has been well-developed over time.
35
 
Next, suppose practical reasoning should be limited to instrumental or consequentialist 
models. I begin with a very simplified example. Assume an omniscient and benevolent agent is 
given an end and that her charge is to maximize outcomes in light of that end. But there is 
nothing in the structure of reality that I am aware of that necessitates that a uniquely best 
outcome must always be possible for all ends whatsoever. Since there might be two equally best 
outcomes that could not both be realized, then in such cases ideally-knowing agents who are 
ideally motivated face a dilemma. Concerning the moral dilemmas of consequentialists, Michael 
Slote says that ‘one can be morally anguished by being in such a position even if one sees one’s 
way clearly as to how to minimize the amount of harm done’.36 He emphasizes what I have 
called DM’s marker 3: ‘it is possible to be morally unhappy with, or rationally rueful of, 
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situationally best actions with terrible consequences’.37 Consequentialists should arm themselves 
with a virtue that blocks both the ethical disintegration of chronic ambivalence and the moral 
failure of insensitivity. But if there are frequent enough cases in which a uniquely best outcome 
is not possible, this ideal consequentialist’s character could not degrade toward moral 
insensitivity or chronic ambivalence. In the first place, conscientiousness is an aspect of ideally 
motivated, ideal-epistemic states. And, in the second place, given that benevolence is fixed 
apriori, this agent cannot be liable to ambivalence or insensitivity, for these defeat effectively 
aiming at good outcomes. But all this is to say that an ideal consequentialist in a moral dilemma 
has DM’s markers 1-4 by hypothesis. 
I said earlier that DM and satisficing are not compatible. But that is true only in first-
order instanciations of DM. The permissions of satisficing take the pressure off agents to bring 
about the best. In contrast, since consequentialist possessors of DM may want equally best but 
incompatible outcomes, then there can be cases in which it will not be readily evident that to step 
back from maximizing or optimizing and to settle for satisficing is a good consequentialist 
decision. When it is not apparent that stepping back from maximizing is permissible, then for 
those cases the agent will want to have developed DM. Moreover, satisficing is not being 
satisfied with ‘whatever’; satisficers should be conscientious with respect to deciding which 
alternatives are and which are not permissible. So another second-order satisficing role for DM 
lies not in the selection of permissibles but in separating the permissibles from the 
impermissibles. 
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What role might DM have within two non-consequentialist theories of practical reason, 
one deriving from Aristotle and one from Kant? First, I will consider David Wiggins’s claim that 
the principal activity of practical reason is its inquiry into ends, the ultimate ideals life plans aim 
to realize. Then, I will argue that it is at least as plausible as alternative interpretations to claim 
that Kant’s theory of practical reason is best not construed as requiring single-mindedness as an 
outcome of conscientious deliberation. Genuine devotion to duty will be strengthened by DM 
because two equally weighty maxims with empirical content that pertain to the same situation 
may each seem correctly to reveal a right alternative, and both cannot be realized. 
Wiggins posits that ‘the main business of practical reason is ends and their constituents, 
not instrumental means’.38 He adds that valid understanding of ends and means always includes 
the qualification that they remain somewhat ‘indefinite and unforeseeable’.39 Wiggins broadens 
this Aristotelian perspective, which accommodates the ineliminably ‘indefinite’, to include a 
plurality of incommensurable final ends. Here ‘incommensurable’ means that ‘there is no 
(however complicated or conditionalized) correct [. . .] explanatory [. . .] account’ of how 
different relevant ends could ‘trade off against one another’.40 Nonetheless, this model of 
practical reason allows that conscientious deliberative conclusions can be reached under such 
conditions ‘in the light of our ideas, our ideals, and [. . .] of that life [. . .] in which we can best 
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find meaning’.41 Here, ‘in the light of’ may be merely ‘somehow’42 (suggesting Rorty’s Whig 
autonomy); and ‘meaning’ depends on ‘shared, partly inexplicit norms of reasonableness’43 
(suggesting Rorty’s Tory habits). 
Where can DM be found in the exercise of Wiggins-type practical reason? Although an 
agent trading off final ends may or may not believe, with Wiggins, that ‘there is no correct’ 
explanation for the outcome of that trade off, such an agent conscientiously trading off final ends 
will find himself doubleminded. And the fact that such a trade off is moral entails moral loss. But 
if morally good alternatives must be denied, or there are inescapable moral wrongs, then this 
agent’s unity will be protected or enhanced by DM.44 
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We might naturally suppose that many will want ‘to spare themselves some of the 
torment of thinking, feeling and understanding that can actually be involved in reasoned 
deliberation’.45 ‘Torment’ is a symptom of loss for the conscientious. But 
[t]he person of real practical wisdom is the one who brings to bear upon a situation the 
greatest number of genuinely pertinent concerns and genuinely relevant considerations 
commensurate with the importance of the deliberative context.
46
 
Such ‘tormented’ conscientiousness is not character-based ambivalence but steadfast practical 
reason, a manifestation of DM. So consequentialist and Wiggins-style models of practical reason 
are at least consistent with DM, and are probably improved by explicit inclusion of DM. 
What about Kantian practical reason? Some argue that a conscientious Kantian could not 
even seem to be confronted by a conflict of duties, while others argue contrariwise. W. A. Hart 
has something sensible to say to both positions. He says both that persons never face genuine 
conflicts of duty but that something like DM is appropriate when it seems they do. 
Where a Kantian moral agent is confronted by what seems to him a serious conflict of 
duties, it is hardly conceivable that he will decide that his duty is to do A and that B has 
no claim upon him whatsoever. What we would expect and what would be more in 
keeping with the seriousness of his quandary is that he decide that his duty is a complex 
package of doing-A-while-showing-a-proper-awareness-of-the-claim-of-B, or doing-A-
and-making-reparation-for-not-doing-B. It is only the over-schematic representation of 
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the moral agent’s situation which makes it seems [sic] as if his choice must be an all-or-
nothing one between A and B.
47
 
These ‘complex packages’ and the ‘seriousness’ of the agent suggest that DM is at work. Indeed, 
three of the four components of DM are clearly present: the agent acts having conscientiously 
developed a ‘complex package’, and this brings an experience of moral loss. Marker 4 is not 
explicit. But Hart would have no compelling reason to deny that enhanced agental integration 
would be an effect of conscientious exercises of apparently conflicted practical reason. For 
Hart’s Kantian, part of that integration could take the form of renewed determination to find a 
path away from the shadows of dilemmas toward the bright anti-realism of only uniquely correct 
duties. 
Hart goes on to say that agents in such situations will do ‘at best, the best of a bad job. 
And any decision about the balance to be struck between the two moral claims is open to the 
charge that it is deeply, even culpably, flawed’.48 This seems both right and wrong. It must be 
right that the conscientious Kantian did the best anyone should expect under the circumstances. 
But it cannot be right to say that the agent doing that is wrong simpliciter. That would commit 
the fallacy of composition. The blamable wrong is doing the moral wrong X, or not doing the 
ethically good Y. But it cannot be wrong to have done Hart’s hyphen-described act, the ‘complex 
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package’, even though it incurs legitimate blame.49 Conscientious Kantians should have the 
latitude to embrace DM. 
Further, if the kingdom of ends is a regulative not a constitutive idea, then not all 
apparent conflicts of duty can be assumed to be practically resolvable. From the participant’s 
point of view, not the observer’s, one can be right to act after conscientiously attempting but 
failing to resolve an apparent dilemma. This is not a problem with such an agent but for such an 
agent. Yet Hart blames agents who face seeming dilemmas and who attempt to resolve them 
conscientiously. 
[I]f the moral agent has, as a Kantian would have, grounds for thinking that there cannot 
be a genuine conflict of duties, then the fact that he appears to be confronted by such a 
conflict is bound to strike him as an index of his own moral shortcomings and lack of 
moral imagination.
50
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Yet it remains true that Kantian moral theory is only theory if it is not practiced, and content is 
necessary for the categorical imperative to become a maxim. Conflicts of duty may all be only 
apparent from the observer’s perspective of pure practical reason, but some merely apparent 
conflicts of duty will be intractably actual from the perspective of the practical reason of 
responsible persons. Kant takes the form of the categorical imperative to be necessarily one. But 
nothing guarantees that the language games in which one duty must be fleshed out will be 
commensurable. It follows that acting on one’s duty maxims will be facilitated by DM. After all, 
no matter how certain and correct a Kantian is that she acts in accord with duty, we cannot blame 
her that she cannot know whether she acts from duty. Hart’s emphasis on ‘shortcomings and 
lack’, if internalized, will precipitate moral insensitivity or ethical ambivalence. 
A place for DM has been located in diverse models of practical reason. This coherence 
with reason deepens and broadens the reasons to recognize DM. And this breadth is explained by 
the ubiquity of dilemmas, real or apparent, by not uncommon narrow differences between 
conclusions of conscientious moral deliberation about single situations, and by the fact that 
‘incommensurability is something entirely commonplace’.51 If aligning DM so emphatically with 
theories of practical reason should be thought to give it an intellectual function unbecoming a 
moral virtue, two of McDowell’s ideas should ease that worry. First, he argues persuasively 
against a sharp separation between the intellectual and moral virtues, a sharpness he claims 
derives from misreading Aristotle. His most emphatic way of putting this point is to claim that 
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for Aristotle there is merely an ‘expository division’ between the moral and intellectual virtues.52 
Second, perhaps we should say that DM is what McDowell and others have called an executive 
virtue. ‘If an agent is to act in accordance with his own best judgment, or to execute a reasoned 
decision made in the absence of a best judgment, he needs executive virtues like firmness of 
will’.53 
It is not surprising how widespread are the occasions of doublemindedness, but it is 
surprising that we have not seen the need to acknowledge its morally praiseworthy form. 
Although no part of my existential claim about DM depends upon this diagnosis, two factors 
seem to have worked together to obscure DM. Seeing that it entails moral loss, we too quickly 
conclude that it is either morally objectionable or deliberatively defective. Then, failing to see 
the distinction between DM and ambivalent character obscures the possible self-integrative 
effects for a doubleminded agent who acts conscientiously. Indeed, attacks on doublemindedness 
as corrupt character have a long history. ‘A doubleminded (dipsuchos) man is unstable 
(akatastatos) in all his ways’ (James 1:8). From James’s point of view a single outcome is 
inevitable. The doubleminded will sear their conscience, tipping from doubleness into deeper 
evil. James’s admonition may have been sound for an audience who needed to establish Tory 
solidarity through a faith not (yet) able to countenance critical Whig attitudes. Ironically, 
Kierkegaard’s more fervent and comprehensive rejection of doublemindedness is in the name of 
solidarity’s other. But there can be no inconsistency in decrying what leads to ethical 
disintegration or moral insensitivity while advocating the virtue that stands firm against these. 
                       
52
 McDowell, ‘Aristotle’s Ethics’, 53. 
53
 McDowell, ‘Incontinence and Practical Wisdom in Aristotle’, 61. 
30 
 
 
III. Toward a Phenomenology of DM 
Hamlet regards Claudius; the mousetrap snaps; he dithers on. In contrast, his interaction 
with the Queen reveals DM. This is so in part because toward Gertrude Hamlet is simultaneously 
and intentionally cruel and kind. In his seminal ‘Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands’, 
Michael Walzer argues that Hamlet’s situation shares important features with the situations of 
conscientious political actors who decide that they must engage in significant moral wrongdoing, 
who must dirty their hands. Walzer does not think that Hamlet’s cruelty toward his mother, his 
moral wrongdoing, constitutes political dirty hands. He says, ‘I don’t want to argue that it [the 
dilemma of dirty hands] is only a political dilemma. No doubt we can get our hands dirty in 
private life also, and sometimes, no doubt, we should’.54 
When Walzer cites the prince, ‘I must be cruel only to be kind’, he picks out Hamlet’s 
DM with respect to his mother.
55
 Without fixing on an expression as I have done, Walzer details 
the admirable doublemindedness: ‘‘I must be cruel’ contains the excuse, since it both admits a 
fault and suggests that Hamlet has no choice but to commit it. [. . .] The rest of the sentence is 
justification, for it suggests that Hamlet intends and expects kindness to be the outcome of his 
actions’.56 Here are DM markers 1-3. His cruelty wrongs his mother, yet through that he seeks a 
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‘greater kindness’.57 This doublemindedness toward Gertrude cannot be explained simply with 
reference to (the complexities of) Hamlet’s character. He seeks the good, righting Denmark’s 
rottenness, and along with this he actively cares for Gertrude’s wellbeing, a non-political good. 
Yet Gertrude’s good is not ‘so complete a justification that Hamlet is able to say that he is not 
really being cruel. ‘Cruel’ and ‘kind’ have exactly the same status’.58 Thus, Hamlet’s interaction 
with Gertrude arises from and proceeds through a doublemindedness concerning kindness and 
cruelty: it does not lead to moral insensitivity toward her, as it did in Ophelia’s case. And in his 
practical attitude toward Gertrude Hamlet seems to rise above those aspects of his character that 
might best be described as chronic ambivalence. With respect to Gertrude, we may cite again a 
passage from Wiggins: 
[t]he person of real practical wisdom is the one who brings to bear upon a situation the 
greatest number of genuinely pertinent concerns and genuinely relevant considerations 
commensurate with the importance of the deliberative context.
59
 
We admire Hamlet precisely in, but of course not only because of, this partial manifestation of 
DM. 
Hamlet’s praiseworthy but conflicted practical reasoning concerning the Queen 
contributes to agental integration. The manifestation of the relevant qualities was occasioned by 
the moral costs of his deliberation about how best to interact with his mother. He anticipates the 
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moral cost of doing the right thing, Hart’s ‘complex package’, with respect to Gertrude, and that 
helps him pluck up how best to do it. Then he feels the cost of overriding the voice that counsels 
kindness to his mother. Such ‘a painful process [. . .] forces a man to weigh the wrong he is 
willing to do in order to do right, and which leaves pain behind, and should do so, even after the 
decision has been made’.60 Since in saying ‘should’ Walzer cannot be prescribing ambivalence 
or insensitivity, then DM is implicit in his analysis. Hamlet’s early death is of a piece with the 
failure of his wider project of self-integration. But lacking all DM he would have been false to 
the moral problem of how here and now to love his wrongdoing mother. 
Although DM in some form may be necessary for tragedy, it may also be a crucial 
accompaniment of enduring moral triumph. Thomas Mann’s Joseph does not merely wear his 
Egyptian Tory habits well but becomes Egyptian because they are shaped and guided by the 
tolerant austerity of his critical Whig orientation. Compare the conclusion of the Oresteia: the 
goddess’s intervention transforms the jury’s impotent doublemindedness into an unnamed moral 
virtue necessary to reconstitute justice. 
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